A sandbox without a network boundary is only half a sandbox

Safe execution of untrusted or AI-generated code requires both compute isolation and strict network egress controls, since a microVM alone cannot prevent code from exfiltrating accessible data, scanning internal services, or abusing credentials through permitted network paths. The discussion emphasizes that DNS, proxies, identity systems, package registries, and allowed destinations all form part of the practical sandbox boundary, and that useful environments need selective, temporary connectivity rather than either unrestricted internet access or total disconnection. Vercel Sandbox enforces these controls with a host-level firewall that intercepts outbound TCP and DNS traffic, applies domain and CIDR policies, examines TLS SNI without decrypting ordinary permitted traffic, and can selectively inspect HTTPS requests when credential injection or request forwarding is configured. Credentials can remain outside the microVM and be injected only for narrowly defined destinations and operations, reducing the risk that malicious code can steal reusable secrets. Organizations can also route selected requests through their own proxy to apply contextual authorization, auditing, content filtering, or supply-chain rules. Vercel presents these firewall capabilities as a baseline feature, arguing that a sandbox’s security depends not only on where code runs but also on what it can contact, what authority it receives, and how those permissions evolve during execution.

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