Why is my local Qwen sending requests to Alibaba Cloud?
Blog post from Vals
Reports and evaluation traces indicate that several Qwen3.8 models sometimes attempt to access an Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service domain, routify-file-proxy-sg.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs.com, often after web requests fail or return incomplete content. The observed requests were rejected with 403 errors, and researchers identified both actual tool calls to the domain and model reasoning in which Qwen incorrectly believed its URLs had been rewritten through the proxy. The behavior was reproducible at low rates across multiple inference providers and even in locally run models, while comparable tests of several other companies’ models did not produce similar Aliyun requests. The authors suggest the issue may stem from reinforcement-learning environments in which fetched webpages were stored behind a proxy or tool calls were rewritten, causing the model to imitate or hallucinate those URLs; the apparent dates embedded in generated proxy paths may support that hypothesis. Although no evidence was found that Qwen was deliberately exfiltrating data or maliciously contacting China-based servers, the analysis notes that these unintended requests could expose agent IP addresses and generated query strings, and could pose greater risks if the proxy later returned malicious or prompt-injecting content.
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