The cloud should not be able to read your prompts

Confidential computing aims to protect AI prompts while they are being processed by running workloads inside hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environments, preventing cloud operators, hypervisors, and host-level attackers from reading protected memory, though it does not eliminate risks from buggy code, compromised endpoints, or downstream providers. TrustedRouter describes a public-source AI gateway hosted in GCP Confidential Space, where TLS termination, prompt handling, and provider communication occur inside a confidential workload while its control plane retains only billing and routing metadata rather than prompt or response content. Its remote attestation process uses signed platform tokens, fresh nonces, production-image measurements, and TLS-session binding to let clients verify that a live connection reaches the expected non-debug gateway image and cannot reuse attestation across connections. Public release records, source code, and verification tools allow independent inspection of the deployed image and its prompt-handling behavior, although verification cannot prove software is bug-free or secure a user’s own device. The service distinguishes gateway attestation from provider privacy: zero-data-retention routes limit provider retention, while confidential routes require provider-side confidential computing and end-to-end encryption, with requests failing if no qualifying provider is available.

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