SalesBleed Explained: How Agentforce Leaked CRM Data Through DNS

SalesBleed refers to three vulnerabilities reported by Zenity Labs in Salesforce Agentforce that showed how malicious instructions submitted through unauthenticated Web-to-Lead forms could trigger zero-click CRM data exfiltration or anonymous phishing in Slack. In the primary attack, an employee’s ordinary request to review recent leads caused an agent to process a poisoned lead, query additional CRM records using its existing permissions, and embed sensitive data in a hostname that was automatically resolved through an image load or Slack link preview, transmitting the data via DNS before an HTTP request or visible user action occurred. Zenity also identified URL-filtering weaknesses involving unrecognized top-level domains and parser differences, as well as a Slack thread-reply capability that initially lacked confirmation and clear attribution of the requesting user. Salesforce was notified in June 2026, implemented fixes over subsequent months, and stated that it found no evidence of customer exploitation. The findings illustrate broader risks for AI agents that combine untrusted external inputs, access to sensitive tools or records, and output rendered by downstream systems, while emphasizing that reliable security assessment should examine network activity, tool calls, and rendered effects rather than relying solely on an agent’s own account of what occurred.

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