SHA-1 in SAML Signatures: Why and How to Reject It in 2026
Blog post from SSOJet
SAML service providers should reject SHA-1-based signatures such as rsa-sha1 because practical SHA-1 collisions have existed since 2017, chosen-prefix attacks relevant to digital signatures were demonstrated in 2020, and NIST plans to retire SHA-1 by December 31, 2030. Although Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, and AD FS generally default to SHA-256, administrators can still configure SHA-1, while tests found that node-saml 5.1 and crewjam/saml 0.5 accept SHA-1-signed SAML responses by default and lack an incoming-signature rejection setting. The recommended mitigation is to inspect every XML signature before library validation and enforce an allowlist of SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 signature and digest algorithms, while also explicitly configuring outbound Node SAML requests to use SHA-256. Implementations should account for encrypted assertions and Redirect-binding logout messages, initially log weak algorithms to identify affected customers, then enforce rejection with clear guidance for updating IdP settings. Testing should include both a deliberately SHA-1-signed response, which must fail, and a normal SHA-256 response, which must succeed, preferably as part of CI.
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