Running Pulumi Neo in a Docker Sandbox: workshop recap

A PocketOS incident in which a coding agent deleted a production volume after finding an overly broad API token illustrates why prompt instructions alone cannot reliably constrain autonomous infrastructure agents. The workshop on running Pulumi Neo inside Docker Sandboxes proposes layered controls: Docker isolates the agent in a microVM, restricts files and network access, and injects credentials through a proxy, while Pulumi applies identity permissions, approval modes, resource protection, policy enforcement, and short-lived OIDC credentials through Pulumi ESC. Speakers argue that agents trained in resettable environments may treat catastrophic failures like ordinary task failures because their reward systems lack consequences for destructive actions, making production safeguards especially important. Infrastructure as code can reduce risk by turning changes into reviewable, policy-checked diffs, but protections must account for credentials, network paths, permissions, and recovery options rather than relying on agent behavior. The recommended approach is to begin with restrictive sandbox networking, monitor and explicitly allow required connections, use balanced approval around production deployments, and pair sandboxing with Pulumi policies and narrowly scoped cloud access.

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