The case for device binding: what it actually protects

Device binding, or device authentication, uses public-key cryptography and hardware-backed keys to restrict account access to one specific verified phone, addressing account takeover risks that passwords, SMS codes, tokens, and often synchronized passkeys cannot fully prevent. During enrollment, a device generates a non-exportable private key in Apple Secure Enclave or Android Keystore hardware, while platform attestation verifies that the key belongs to a genuine, uncompromised physical device; later logins require the enrolled device to sign a server challenge after biometric or PIN verification. Unlike passkeys, which are designed to synchronize across a user’s devices for convenience, device binding is intended for businesses such as banks and fintechs that require access to remain limited to an approved device. It can serve either as a second factor for sensitive actions or as a passwordless first factor, with Ory’s app PIN offering an alternative for users without or unwilling to use biometrics while protecting against offline guessing through rate limits and key destruction after repeated failures. Ory’s implementation supports iOS and Android native applications and meets NIST AAL2 requirements, with potential future support for AAL3 when keys use dedicated security hardware.

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