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Safety for Whom? Refusing the Right Subset of a Topic, Not the Whole Topic

Blog post from Hugging Face

Post Details
Company
Date Published
Author
Antonio Tiene, Alejo Lopez Avila, and Iker García-Ferrero
Word Count
1,437
Company Posts That Month
82
Language
-
Hacker News Points
-
Post removed?
No
Summary

“Safety for Whom? Boundary-Aware Self-Distillation for Controlled LLM Safety Refusal” argues that AI safety systems should distinguish harmful requests from legitimate requests within the same broad topic rather than refusing entire categories such as politics. Using political manipulation versus factual political information as a test case, the researchers define narrow safety boundaries through matched harmful and benign prompt pairs and identify shortcomings in standard self-generated safety-training pipelines, including incomplete coverage of difficult harmful prompts, insufficient benign examples with dangerous-looking language, and evaluation methods that miss nearby false refusals. Their approach uses escalating retries to retain more harmful training examples, verified in-distribution benign data, and boundary pairs to train and assess both refusal and compliance behavior. Experiments with Qwen3-8B showed that stronger harmful-request refusal can dramatically increase over-refusal on safe prompts unless the benign side of the boundary is explicitly included, while adding benign boundary data reduced false refusals near the boundary from 32.94% to 4.16% with only a small decline in harmful-request refusal. The work concludes that deployment-specific safety policies require measuring and managing the trade-off between preventing harmful responses and preserving useful answers to permissible requests.

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