Webhook verification for coding agent changes

Webhook verification changes made by coding agents can introduce security weaknesses even when legitimate deliveries continue to work, particularly if request bodies are transformed before signature validation, signatures are compared unsafely, or replay protections are omitted. Secure implementations should verify the exact raw bytes received from providers, follow each provider’s distinct signing contract, use trusted secret configuration, reject malformed or unsupported inputs, and parse payloads only after authentication. Testing should cover altered bodies, invalid or missing signatures, incorrect secrets, timestamp tolerance boundaries, duplicate deliveries, framework body-parser behavior, and secret-rotation overlap and retirement policies without exposing real secrets or customer data. Pull requests should document the provider requirements, raw-body flow, comparison method, timestamp and deduplication policies, and executed tests, while combining security review with runtime API testing to provide evidence that framework behavior preserves the verification boundary.

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