Keeping secrets out of agent-generated commits

Coding agents can inadvertently expose credentials by reading sensitive configuration, logs, fixtures, or tool output and copying them into source files, generated artifacts, or Git history, so secret protection should begin before an agent edits code and continue through commit and push. Recommended practices include granting only necessary access, using short-lived and narrowly scoped credentials, relying on environment injection and sanitized test data, identifying sensitive paths in repository guidance, and preventing secrets from appearing in prompts, snapshots, issue comments, or diagnostic uploads. Factory’s Droid Shield scans added lines during agent-driven Git commits and pushes, but manual Git activity requires additional safeguards such as CI secret scanning, pre-commit checks, hosting-provider scanning, and server-side push protection. Teams should also inspect non-source artifacts such as source maps, notebook outputs, recordings, archives, and encoded fixtures, maintain narrowly reviewed allowlists, and treat confirmed exposure as an incident by blocking publication, revoking or rotating affected credentials, documenting remediation without restating the secret, reviewing access logs, and improving the path that exposed the value.

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