The blog post details the resurgence and evolution of the QakBot banking trojan, focusing on its recent campaigns and the CrowdStrike Falcon Complete team's efforts to mitigate its impact. In this second installment of a three-part series, the analysis highlights a failed QakBot campaign in April 2020, where a ZIP-based delivery method using a Visual Basic Script (VBS) dropper malfunctioned due to poor error handling. The post describes how QakBot employs various anti-analysis techniques to evade detection, yet the CrowdStrike platform successfully prevents the malware from completing its execution chain. The narrative also covers experimental campaigns in June 2020, where QakBot operators introduced new payloads such as PicturesViewer.dll and a secondary malware, Zloader, showcasing the threat actors' ability to quickly adapt and modify their tactics. The blog concludes by emphasizing the persistent threat posed by QakBot and hints at future insights into the Falcon Complete team's strategies for remote remediation of QakBot infections.